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REGULAR EDUCATION TEACHERS FORMULATING SPECIAL
EDUCATION PLANS:

M.L.

V. FEDERAL WAY SCHOOL DISTRICT AND THE IDEA

I.

INTRODUCTION

The world of special education is governed today by a body of
statutory law known as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA). 1 The IDEA mandates that each special education student receive
an "individualized education plan" (IEP) specifically formulated to
accommodate that student's individual needs. The IDEA has many
detailed requirements, one of which demands the inclusion of a regular
education teacher, or one who teaches "regular" rather than "special"
education classes, at IEP development meetings. This requirement is
primarily aimed at giving special education students the opportunity to
integrate at an appropriate level into regular education classrooms. The
regular education teacher adds an important perspective to the IEP
regarding the needs and capabilities of a student with special needs
among his regular education peers.
The importance of the regular education teacher's involvement in the
development of a special education plan drives the main issue in M.L. v.
Federal Way School District? M.L. was a young kindergarten student
whose experience in a regular preschool suggested the possibility of at
least some integration into a regular kindergarten classroom. 3 The
presence at his IEP development meeting of a regular education teacher,
particularly his regular preschool teacher, would have been extremely
valuable in formulating optimal educational opportunities for M.L. The
failure of the Federal Way School District to include a regular education
teacher in M.L.'s IEP development meeting constituted a procedural
violation of the IDEA.
This case note deals with judicial treatment of IDEA procedural
violations and, in particular, the Ninth Circuit's treatment of a school

1. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1482 (West 2005).
2. 394 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2941 (2005).
3. Id. at 637
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district's failure to include a regular education teacher in an IEP. Should
courts automatically invalidate an IEP for which the development
process was procedurally flawed, or should invalidation also require a
showing that the procedural error caused substantive harm? Should the
question turn on the nature of the procedural error? IDEA procedural
violations constitute a somewhat undeveloped area of law, and yet
emerging trends in federal courts lean toward at least some analysis of
substantive harm. M.L. represents one of very few federal cases
addressing the regular education teacher requirement of the IDEA. Judge
Alarcon, writing for the Ninth Circuit in M.L., adopts an unconventional
approach that leaves educators, students and courts still wondering what
treatment IDEA procedural violations ought to receive in federal courts.
Under his approach, procedural defect precludes the court's review of
substantive harm. The other two judges in the three-judge panel
disagreed with this analytical framework, and called for a more
conventional harmless error component as part of the analysis.
A reading of the M.L. 's majority, concurring and dissenting
opinions begs the questions: Is there still a gap in the law? What do the
procedural requirements of the IDEA, such as the regular education
teacher requirement, mean? How should courts, in the Ninth Circuit and
elsewhere, respond to such violations in the future? Although the Ninth
Circuit addresses these questions in M.L., it provides few clear answers.
This case note addresses these questions from a variety of perspectives.
Part II provides important background information, detailing the
relevant provisions of the statute and describing the legislative history of
the regular education teacher requirement in the 1997 amendments to
the IDEA. Part III offers the facts and procedural history of M.L. and
places the Federal Way School District's procedural violation in the
context of the legislative requirement. Part IV canvasses federal case law,
controlling and otherwise, related to the regular education teacher
requirement. Finally, Part V asks how this requirement is viewed and
implemented in public schools throughout the country. Part VI
constitutes a brief conclusion.
II. THE REGULAR EDUCATION TEACHER REQUIREMENT AND ITS
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

A. The Statute
The IDEA's many requirements are all designed to provide
educational opportunity, or a "free appropriate public education"
(FAPE), for children with special needs. The development of an IEP
offers individual attention to each child with special needs and results in
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the creation of an educational plan tailored to the child's specific needs.
As a part of this effort, the IDEA spells out exactly who should participate
in the development of the IEP. According to the federal statute, the IEP
team should include parents, special education teachers or providers,
other school officials, and "not less than [one] regular education
teacher. . . (if the child is, or may be, participating in the regular
education environment)." 4 The IDEA further describes the regular
education teacher's participation in IEP development as follows:
A regular education teacher of the child, as a member of the IEP Team,
shall, to the extent appropriate, participate in the development of the
IEP of the child, including the determination of appropriate positive
behavioral interventions and supports, and other strategies, and the
determination of supplementary aids and services, program
modifications, and support for school personnel .... 5
Thus, the IDEA qualifies the regular education teacher requirement
in two ways. First, the regular education teacher's involvement is
necessary only if the student has a chance of participating in a regular
education environment. Second, the regular education teacher is
required to participate only "to the extent appropriate," or to the extent
to which the regular education teacher might be needed to offer
suggestions for positive support. 6
B. History of the Statute

The legislative history of the IDEA and its amendments offers some
explanation of Congress' reasoning and intent in both including and also
limiting the regular education teacher requirement. First, including a
regular education teacher on the IEP team is consistent with the IDEA's
effort to mainstream students with special needs. The requirement also
provides an opportunity for necessary collaboration between the
student's regular education and special education teachers and invites the
regular education teacher's necessary perspective on the needs of the
special education student in a regular education classroom. Finally, a
reading of the legislative history of the IDEA brings into focus the
legislators' intent that a regular education teacher's involvement be
limited to those aspects of the IEP which are relevant to this teacher's
interaction with and teaching of the student.
First, involving regular education teachers in the schooling of special
education students is a necessary aspect of mainstreaming these students.
4. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(l)(B) (composition of the IEP team) (italics added).
5. Jd. at§ 1414(d)(3)(C) (requirement with respect to regular education teacher).
6. Sen. Rpt. 104-275 at 149 (May 20, 1996).
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In the process of creating and passing the 1997 amendments to the
IDEA, Congress found that:
[T]o the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities
[should be] educated with children who are nondisabled and that
special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with
disabilities from the regular educational environment [should occur]
only when the nature or severity of the disability is such that education
in regular classes with the use of special education and related services
or supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.?
Various testimonials before congressional committees and
subcommittees reflected a general understanding that the involvement of
a regular education teacher in the creation of a student's special
educational plan is part of a larger effort to assimilate disabled students
into regular classes where possible. The testimonials also highlighted the
benefits of this mainstreaming. Including special needs students in
regular classrooms gives them preparation for "real life" 8 and can even
result in increased academic performance for all students. 9 Furthermore,
the integration of regular education and special education students helps
"demystify special education and lessen any stigma attached to [special
education students]." 10 These benefits and others are derived from the
simple placement of a special needs student in a regular classroom.
Second, as special education students are placed in regular
classrooms, it is vital that the teachers of these regular classrooms
participate in the creation of their students' educational plans. Where
regular education teachers are directing some of a student's daily
education, an IEP created solely by special education teachers would be
particularly inadequate in helping students with disabilities "to be
successful in inclusive settings." 11 Regular education teachers can provide

7. Id. at 38
8. Sen. Subcomm. on Disability Policy of the Comm. on Lab. & Human Resources,
Reauthorization Hearings of the IDEA, 104th Cong. 98 (May II, 1995) (testimony of a special
education teacher, Ms. Matty Rodriguez-Walling) [hereinafter Reauthorization Hearings of the
IDEA].
9. Sen. Comm. on Lab. and Human Resources, Reauthorization of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 105th Cong. 81 (Jan. 29, 1997) (testimony of a Pittsburgh, PA school
board member, Elisabeth T. Healey) [hereinafter Reauthorization of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act]; Reauthorization Hearings of the IDEA, supra n. 8, at !04, 107 (testimony of a special
education teacher, Ms. Sharon Gonder).
10. Reauthorization Hearings of the IDEA, supra n. 8. at 99 (testimony of a special education
teacher, Ms. Matty Rodriguez· Walling).
II. H.R. Subcomm. on Early Childhood, Youth, and Families of the Comm. on Economic and
Educational Opportunities, Hearings on the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, I 04th Cong.
215 (june 27, 1995) (testimony of an early childhood special education teacher, Miss Marlise E.
Stieglitz).

2]

M.L. FEDERAL WAY SCHOOL DIST. AND THE IDEA

643

important perspective on "what is possible in the regular class and what
is needed for success" in an integrated setting. 12 Collaboration between
regular and special education teachers helps avoid the well-documented
problem of "unnecessary duplication of instruction and in some cases
conflicting instructional programs ... [which] impede the academic
progress of students with disabilities." 13 Likewise, appropriate behavior
management techniques can be developed where needed. 14 Inclusion of
regular education teachers in the development of the educational plan
helps prevent these teachers from feeling "that their hands are tied when
it comes to children with disabilities" 15 and begins the important process
of "giving teachers the tools that they need to teach all children." 16
Finally, the legislative history of the IDEA amendments and
reauthorization clearly demonstrates Congress' intent to limit regular
education teachers' involvement in IEP formulation to an extent
proportional to their involvement with the special education student. A
House Report summarizes the statute's intent as follows:
Very often, regular education teachers play a central role in the
education of children with disabilities. In that regard the bill provides
that regular education teachers participate on the IEP Team, but this
provision is to be construed in light of the bill's proviso that the regular
education teacher, to the extent appropriate, participate in the
development of the IEP of the child. The Committee recognizes the
reasonable concern that the provision including the regular education
teacher might create an obligation that the teacher participate in all
aspects of the IEP Team's work. The Committee does not intend that to
be the case and only intends it to be to the extent appropriateY

This limitation essentially avoids adding "unnecessarily to the
demands on teachers." 18 One Senate Report describes the requirement as,
"to the extent appropriate, at least one regular education teacher who
knows the child or is familiar with the curriculum of the child, if the child

12. Reauthorization of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, supra n. 9, at 61
(testimony of judith E. Heumann, Assistant Secretary, Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative
Services).
13. Reauthorization Hearings of the IDEA, supra n. 8 (available at 1995 WL 283270) (written
testimony of Dr. Herbert Rieth, Professor and Chair of the Department of Special Education at
Vanderbilt University).
14. 142 Con g. Rec. H6083 (daily ed. June I 0, 1996) (House debates, representative from
Hawaii)
15. Jd.
16. 143 Cong. Rec. H2498 (daily ed. May 13, 1997) (House debates, representative from
California).
17. H.R. Rpt. I 05-95 at I 03 (May 13, 1997).
18. Sen. Rpt. 104-275 at 49 (May 20, 1996)
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is, or may be, participating in the regular education environment." 19
Thus, when Congress directed the inclusion of a regular education
teacher on the IEP team, it likely intended that this teacher be one
familiar with the specific student and that the teacher's participation be
limited to relevant portions of the IEP.
III. M.L. V. FEDERAL WAY SCHOOL DISTRICT
A. Statement of Facts

M.L. was a five-year-old kindergarten student in the Federal Way
School District (FWSD) suffering from disabilities including autism,
mental retardation, and macrocephaly. 20 Prior to his enrollment in an
FWSD elementary school, M.L. attended three years of preschool in the
Tukwila School District. 21 His preschool class was an "integrated class" 22
and, therefore, included both regularly developing children as well as a
few disabled students. 23 During his time in preschool, M.L. received fulltime aid from a one-on-one assistant, and gradually M.L. learned to
participate to some degree with other students in classroom exercises. 24
These preschool years also saw increasing aggressiveness in M.L.'s
interactions with others. 25
Each year the Tukwila School District was required to create an IEP
for M.L. as set forth in 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A). 26 The IEP served to
measure M.L.'s educational progress and determine the level and type of
special educational services to be provided for him during the following
year. 27 M.L's IEP team in the Tukwila School District suggested
placement in an integrated kindergarten class for the school year 20002001.28 They also outlined other therapy and educational services he
would receive in combination with his classroom time. 29
M.L.'s family moved from the Tukwila School District into the
FWSD shortly before his enrollment in kindergarten. 30 The FWSD opted

19. Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
20. M.L., 394 F.3d at 636-37.
21. Id. at 637.
22. I d.
23. Id. at 637 n. 4
24. Id. at 637.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. ld.
28. Id. at 638.
29. I d.
30. /d.
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to apply the Tukwila IEP until the end of September when it would
expire, and M.L. was accordingly enrolled in an integrated kindergarten
class. 31 M.L. attended this class for five days. Each assistant hired to work
one-on-one with M.L. quit after one day. 32 M.L.'s mother, who attended
the kindergarten class during these days, expressed concern to the
teacher that other children were teasing M.L., though she admitted she
was unsure whether he was actually affected by the teasing since he was
wearing headphones and listening to music while the other children were
teasing him 33 M.L. did not return to the integrated kindergarten class
after the first five days. His mother refused the FWSD's suggestion of
enrolling M.L. in a class designed for disabled students, preferring
instead a setting which would allow for greater interaction with regular
education students. 34
In early October shortly after the Tukwila IEP had expired, M.L.'s
mother met with several specialists to evaluate M.L.'s need for special
education services. This group of specialists assessed M.L.'s abilities and
created a report recommending his placement in a special education
program, but again, M.L.'s mother objected to this type of plan. 35 In
November, FWSD officials attempted to arrange an IEP meeting with
M.L,'s parents, but his mother insisted she and her husband could
neither attend nor participate via conference call in an IEP on any day
between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. Therefore, when the IEP
meeting was held, neither of M.L.'s parents attended. Also, no regular
education teacher participated. 36 The IEP team reviewed M.L.'s school
records and determined he should be placed in a smaller classroom
designed for autistic students. 37 The FWSD mailed this decision to M.L.'s
parents with a letter inviting them to help refine or otherwise discuss the
IEP. At this point, M.L.'s parents sought a due process hearing before an
administrative law judge (ALJ). 38
B. Application of Legislative Intent to the Facts of M.L.

The legislative history of the IDEA's regular education teacher
requirement has clear implications for M.L.'s story. Prior to his brief stint
in a regular education kindergarten classroom, M.L. spent three years in
31. ld.
32. I d.
33. Id.
34. Jd. at 639.
35. !d.
36. Id. at 640.
37. ld. at 640-41.
38. I d. at 641.
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a regular preschool, which suggested that he should have the option of
integration. One might argue that M.L.'s disabilities, though manageable
in a preschool classroom, have the potential to make integration more
difficult with each passing year. On the other hand, M.L. was still in
kindergarten, and aside from his brief five-day stay in that classroom,
there had been no indication that he could not continue on a regular
education path during his kindergarten year. The legislature intended
IDEA to require the involvement of a teacher who knows the potential of
a student with special needs, as well as the limitations of a regular
classroom, in the development of his IEP. 39 The failure to include a
regular education teacher, such as M.L.'s preschool teacher or at least the
kindergarten teacher that knew him briefly, deprived M.L's IEP of the
regular education teacher perspective, thus defeating the legislative goals
of providing effective mainstreaming benefits to special needs students.
C. Analysis of M.L. by the Courts

The procedural history of M.L. presents somewhat conflicting
standards for upholding this legislative intent. The due process hearing
was held in February 2001 and ran for eight days. The ALJ determined
the IEP team was "appropriately constituted." 40 Then, M.L.'s parents
appealed the ALJ's decision to the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington, arguing that the FWSD had failed to
meet the IDEA's procedural requirements since no regular education
teacher was on the IEP team. 41 The district court granted summary
judgment to the FWSD, finding the IEP team adequate and stating that
"[e]ven if ... the district's failure to include a regular education teacher of
M.L.'s on the IEP team amounted to a procedural violation of the IDEA,
such violation would not necessarily constitute the denial of a FAPE." 42
Appealing to the Ninth Circuit, M.L.'s parents argued that the lack of
a regular education teacher on the IEP team was a significant procedural
violation. 43 The Ninth Circuit reviewed the case as a three-judge panel
and produced an opinion, a concurrence, and a dissent. 44 The majority
opinion, penned by Judge Alarcon, held that the FWSD's failure to

39. Sen. Rpt. 104-275 at 149 (May 20, 1996).
40. Id. The issue of the parents' non-attendance at the IEP meeting was addressed by the ALJ,
who found M.L.'s parents' argument as to why they could not attend to be not credible. Id. at 640. It
does not appear that ML's parents raised this issue at later proceedings. Id. at 641-42.
Id.
42. Id.

41.

43. Id. at 641-42.
44. Id. at 636, 651 (Gould,
(Clifton, J., dissenting).

J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), 658
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include a regular education teacher on the IEP team constituted fatal
procedural error which invalidated the IEP. 45 The opinion adopted what
the concurring opinion labels a "per se" standard; this particular
procedural defect is found to invalidate the IEP regardless of its
substantive effect. 46 The concurring opinion agreed with the majority's
decision to invalidate the IEP but preferred to apply harmless error
review, and thus arrived at this result by concluding that not only had
there been a procedural violation, but also that this error caused harm to
M.LY The dissent also preferred the harmless error analysis, but in its
application arrived at an opposite result, arguing that the lack of a regular
education teacher on the IEP team constituted harmless error in this
case. 48
IV. FEDERAL CASE LAW BACKGROUND FOR M.L.

Because the particular question of procedural error at issue in M.L.
has not been definitively answered by the Supreme Court, the M.L.
majority opinion included a review of several cases dealing with various
kinds of procedural violations of the IDEA. 49 The issue is not one which
frequently arises in federal court, thus the M.L. court's discussion was
somewhat limited, relying primarily on Ninth Circuit cases and a
Supreme Court case. The concurring opinion included a footnote listing
several cases from other circuits. 5 Federal case law on procedural
violation of the IDEA is not vast, possibly because students, parents and
school districts bring complaints before ALJs before bringing them to
federal court as a last resort.
A thorough survey of federal case law on this issue is useful in
recognizing trends among those cases which do reach federal court. This
section is divided into three parts. The first part surveys cases in which
federal courts have addressed various types of procedural violations of
the IDEA and the effect of such violations on the substantive promise of
the IDEA that each child receive a FAPE. The second part surveys those
few cases which specifically address the failure to include a regular
education teacher on the IEP team. Finally, the third part compares all of
that case law with M.L., arguing that Judge Alarcon's approach is
somewhat unconventional and leaves room for substantially different

°

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

!d. at 651.
Id. at 651 (Gould,)., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 651-52 (Gould,)., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 658 (Clifton,)., dissenting).
!d. at 644-48.
!d. at 654 n. 6 (Gould,)., concurring).
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interpretations.
A. Federal Court Analysis of Procedural Violation of the IDEA Generally
1. U.S. Supreme Court

The U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Board of Education v. Rowlei 1
is commonly recognized as the Supreme Court guidance on procedural
violation of the IDEA. 52 It is interesting, however, that the main issue in
Rowley, the distinction between maximizing the educational potential of
a special education student and simply providing some educational
benefit, was not procedural at all. 53 As a secondary part of the opinion,
the Court addressed the question of what role courts should play in
reviewing administrative decisions under the Act. 54 The Court
recognized that the Act is much more specific in delineating procedural
requirements than substantive rights and concluded, therefore, that
Congress specifically intended procedural compliance as well as
substantive. 55 Thus, the Rowley Court dictated that reviewing courts ask
(a) if the State has complied with procedural requirements, and (b) if the
IEP, created through these procedures, is reasonably calculated to benefit
the student. 56
As the Court applied this two-part inquiry to Rowley itself, it
addressed the first question in less than a single sentence, briefly noting
that the case included no findings that the school district had failed to
comply with the procedural requirements of the Act. 57 Thus, in Rowley,
the Supreme Court did not even apply a total analytical framework for
procedural error. Since no later case has caused the Supreme Court to
address the issue of procedural violation of the IDEA, other courts have
been left to apply this standard in a variety of ways.

51. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
52. See e.g. Kern Alexander & M. David Alexander, American Public School Law 497 (6th ed.,
Wadsworth 2005) ("As stated in Rowley, a reviewing court must make sure that procedures are
followed."); see also Mitchell L. Yell, The Law and Special Education 153 (Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1998)
("The first principle of the Rowley test establishes the importance of adherence to the procedural
aspects of a FAPE.").
53. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203; see Alexander & Alexander, supra n. 52, at 499 (describing the
rule of Rowley as follows: "The 'Free Appropriate Public Education' clause of the EAHCA does not
require a State to maximize the potential of each special-needs child.").
54. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 204-08.
55. Id. at 205-06.
56. Id. at 206-07.
57. Id. at 209 ("Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found that petitioners had
failed to comply with the procedures of the Act .... ").
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2. The Ninth Circuit
Amanda /. ex rel. Annette /. v. Clark County School District58 raised
the important issue of parental involvement in IEP formulation. Parental
involvement is one of the hallmarks of the IDEA, and the right of parents
to participate in directing the education of their special needs child is
carefully guarded by a variety of procedural requirements. 59 Therefore,
courts may invalidate IEPs in cases where parents have been denied this
participation. 60 In Amanda]., the Ninth Circuit addressed only the first
question of the Rowley analysis, finding procedural violations that
effectively denied Amanda's parents the right to participate fully in her
IEP development and consequently denied Amanda of a FAPE. 61 While
the court acknowledged that "[n]ot every procedural violation ... is
sufficient to support a finding that the child in question was denied a
FAPE," 62 it asserted that a child is denied a FAPE if procedural violations
cause "loss of educational opportunity," infringement upon parental
right to participate, or "deprivation of educational benefits." 63
Shapiro ex rel. Shapiro v. Paradise Valley Unified School District No.
6964 also dealt with both failure to include parents in IEP development
and failure to include a particular teacher (a special education teacher,
not a regular education teacher) on the IEP team that knew the student
well. The Ninth Circuit held that the failure to include the parents and
teacher in question was a procedural violation which denied the student a
FAPE. 65 Following the analytical framework from Amanda/., the court

58. 267 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2001).
59. Id. at 882 ("Among the most important procedural safeguards are those that protect the
parents' right to be involved in the development of their child's educational plan."); see e.g. Rowley,
458 U.S. at 205-06 ("It seems to us no exaggeration to say that Congress placed every bit as much
emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of
participation at every stage of the administrative process ... as it did upon the measurement of the
resulting IEP against a substantive standard."); see also Allan G. Osborne, Jr. & Charles J. Russo,
Special Education and the Law: A Guide for Practitioners 79-80 (Corwin Press, Inc. 2003) (explaining
that the IDEA gives parents "unprecedented" rights to participate in the special education planning
of their children); Yell, supra n. 52 at 186 (stating that parental involvement in the IEP process was
one of Congress' most important goals in the 1997 IDEA amendments).
60. See Yell, supra n, 52 at 172 ("'EPs developed without parental input have been invalidated
(citation omitted).").
61. Amanda f., 267 F.3d at 895 (stating that since the procedural violations denied Amanda of
a FAPF., the court need not address whether the IEP was reasonably calculated to offer educational
benefit).
62. !d. at 892.
63. !d. (citations omitted).
64. 317 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2003).
65. Id. at 1076.
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decided that it need not address the second prong of Rowley. 66 The court
specifically addressed the teacher requirements of the IDEA as a part of
its analysis and determined that the "IDEA requires the persons most
knowledgeable about the child to attend the IEP meeting." 67
3. Sister Circuits

Other circuits have also faced the question of how to apply Rowley to
cases alleging procedural violation of the IDEA. Courts have typically
addressed whether these procedural violations resulted in the loss of a
FAPE to the student. A reading of these various cases reveals a consistent
trend that where there is no showing that a student was denied a FAPE,
the court will not find that a procedural error invalidated the IEP. Thus,
it is unlikely that those students and their parents will be able to obtain
relief in the federal court system without demonstrating lost educational
opportunity or lack of parental participation, and the resultant denial of a
FAPE.
For example, the Fourth Circuit in MM determined that a school
district's failure to finalize an IEP by the beginning of the school year
constituted procedural defect, stating that " [w] hen such a procedural
defect exists, we are obliged to assess whether it resulted in the loss of an
educational opportunity for the disabled child, or whether, on the other
hand, it was a mere technical contravention of the IDEA." 68 In this
instance, the court found procedural defect but did not find that lost
educational opportunity resulted from this defect. 69 In another case in
the same year, the Fourth Circuit went on to create an "actual
interference" standard, stating that the court could not award relief to
parents without "a showing that the violation actually interfered with the
provision of a FAPE to the disabled child." 70 Each of these cases cited
Rowley for underlying principles expressed by the Supreme Court, but
neither expressly followed the Rowley two-part analysis. Likewise, the
Tenth Circuit cited Rowley for the principle that the FAPE requirement is
satisfied if the child receives educational benefit. 71 Despite its reliance on
66. Id. at 1079.
67.

Id. at 1076 (citations omitted).

68. MM ex rei DM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville County. 303 F.3d 523,533 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing
Gadsby ex rei. Gadsby v. Grasmick, 109 F .3d 940, 956 (4th Cir. 1997)).
69. ld. at 535.
70. DiBuo ex rei.DiBuo v. Bd. of Educ. of Worcester County. 309 F3d 184, 190 (4th Cir. 2002)
(emphasis added) (granting no relief to parents where the IEP team opted not to consider services
requested by the parents since the team had determined the student to be ineligible to receive these
services).
71. T.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 54, 265 F.3d 1090, 1091 (lOth Cir. 2001) (citation omitted),
cert. denied, 535 U.S. 927 (2002).
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Rowley, the court then addressed procedural violation by stating,
"[p ]rocedural defects alone do not constitute a violation of the right to a
FAPE unless they result in the loss of an educational opportunity." 72
Some circuits addressed the Rowley test more explicitly, applying it
with varying degrees of specificity and exactness. For example, the
Eleventh Circuit directly stated the test as articulated in Rowley, but
found in applying this test that despite the presence of procedural error,
the IEP was reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit. 73 The
court expressly stated, with regard to the effect of these two prongs on
each other, that "the court must consider the impact of the procedural
defect, and not merely the defect per se." 74
Also, the Sixth Circuit applied the Rowley test in much the same way
as the Ninth Circuit, by addressing only the first prong?5 In fact, the
court was not content with merely determining whether there had been
procedural violation, but rather saw the question as having a substantive
element. 76 Thus, the court not only determined that the school district's
failure to hold a particular IEP meeting constituted procedural violation
but also determined that this defect had denied the student a FAPE.
Upon making these determinations, the court concluded that addressing
the second Rowley prong was unnecessary? 7
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit addressed the question of whether
procedural error (in this case, the failure to follow a few technical
requirements of an IEP) could alone invalidate the IEP? 8 It cited Rowley
but stated the first part of the two-part test somewhat differently. Rather
than merely asking if procedural error existed, the court asked if "a
procedural violation of the IDEA produced substantive harm." 79 In this
instance, the court found that the parents had not made a showing of
substantive harm. 80 Despite variations in the technical application of the
Rowley test, each federal court seemed to concur that the question of
72. !d. at 1095 (holding that a student who claimed violation of the IDEA where his school
district did not offer him an exit interview prior to graduation did not make any claim that this
alleged violation was a denial of a FAPE and that he therefore was not entitled to relief).
73. Sch. Bd. of Collier County, Fla. v. K.C., 285 F.3d 977, 982-83 (lith Cir. 2002).
7 4. Jd. at 982 (citations omitted).
75. Knable ex rei. Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238 f.3d 755, 764-67 (6th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 533 U.S. 950 (2001).
76. Jd. at 764 ("Even if we conclude that [the school district] did not comply with the Act's
procedural requirements, such a finding does not necessarily mean that the [plaintiffs] are entitled to
relief. Rather, we must inquire as to whether the procedural violations have caused substantive
harm ... ") (citations omitted).
77.

Id. at 767.

78. Adam/. ex rei. Robert]. v. Keller Ind. Sch. Dist., 328 f.3d 804,811-12 (5th Cir. 2003).
79. Id. at 812-13.
80. Jd.
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procedural violation goes hand-in-hand with a question of substantive
harm.

B. Judicial Treatment of Failure to Include a "Regular Education Teacher"
on the IEP Team
The Sixth Circuit's analysis of procedural defect in Deal v. Hamilton
County Board of Education, 81 (which was argued, decided and filed
during the same time period as M.L.) relied heavily on the legislative
purpose of the regular education teacher requirement. 82 In this case, the
district court found that the failure to include a regular education teacher
on the IEP team did not cause substantive harm. The Sixth Circuit agreed
that this defect did not cause substantive harm, but nevertheless reversed
the lower court's holding, citing the close connection between this
requirement and the IDEA's important "least restrictive environment"
goal. 83 While the court recognized that not all procedural violations
merit relief without a showing of resultant substantive harm, 84 it basically
said failure to include a regular education teacher was one exception. In
essence, the court awarded the parents some level of relief despite a
determination that the defect had not substantively affected their child's
placement or educational opportunity.
A federal district court in New York offered a well- reasoned opinion
on the issue of the regular education teacher requirement in Arlington
Central School District v. D.K. ex rei. C.K. 85 With little or no precedent
with regard to this specific procedural violation, the court reviewed other
federal circuit courts' conclusions with regard to other types of
procedural violations that only procedural errors which actually result in
substantive harm can invalidate an IEP. 86 The facts of Arlington, as the
court explained, suggested that a regular education teacher could provide
valuable input into the IEP development. 87 Given these facts and the
legislative preference for mainstreaming where possible, the court
determined that there was a "rational basis" for finding that the lack of a
regular education teacher's perspective resulted in an inadequate IEP. 88

81. 392 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 422 (2005).
82. Id. at 860-61.
83. Id. at 860-61, n. 15 ("The regulation explicitly requires the attendance of a 'regular
education teacher of the child.' . . . The regulation does not state an exception where other
knowledgeable people are present.").
84. Id. at 854.
85. 2002 WL 31521158 at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2002).
86. Id. at *8.
87. Id. at *9.
88. Id. at **8-9.
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In essence, once the court found a procedural violation, it then asked if
there was any rational basis for believing the procedural violation could
result in substantive harm.
These cases, however, do not control the Ninth Circuit's decision in
M.L. The closest the Ninth Circuit has come to addressing the failure to
include a regular education teacher on the IEP team is in the 1992 case,
W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District No. 23. 89
Arising before the 1997 IDEA amendments which specified the inclusion
of a "regular education teacher," this case dealt with the failure to include
the student's "regular classroom teacher," or in other words, the teacher
that was most knowledgeable about the student. 90 The IEP team in
Target Range failed to seek input from any teacher at the student's private
school who was knowledgeable about the student. 91 The Ninth Circuit
formulated for the first time its application of the first prong of the
Rowley test, suggesting that this prong seeks not only a finding of
procedural error but also a finding that this error resulted in the denial of
a FAPE. 92 This analysis essentially created a precedent suggesting that the
failure to include a required teacher is a procedural violation which
results in denial of a FAPE.
C. Comparison of Case Law Precedent and M.L.

In M.L., Judge Alarcon adopted a structural defect approach which
differs from the former approaches of the Ninth Circuit or its sister
circuits in analyzing procedural error. The general trend in federal courts
has been to review the procedure for error and then analyze whether that
error had the substantive effect of denying a child a FAPE, inferring this
denial where the student showed lost educational opportunity or lack of
parental involvement. The failure to include a regular education teacher
has rarely arisen in federal court, and on these occasions courts have
been particularly sensitive to this defect because of its clear connection to
the legislative goals of mainstreaming. Likewise, Judge Alarcon was
sensitive to the importance of this particular procedural requirement, but
his approach is distinctly unconventional. His arguments were similar in
substance to more typical procedural error analysis (i.e. that the facts
suggest M.L. might have been placed in a regular classroom, 93 that the

89. 960 F.2d 1479 (9th Cir. 1992).
90. Id.at 1484.
91. Id. at 1482, 1484.
92. Id. at 1484. The Ninth Circuit continued applying the first prong of Rowley in this manner
in other cases. See supra nn. 51-67 and accompanying discussion of Amanda f. and Shapiro.
93. M.L., 394 f.3d at 648.
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procedural violation was therefore "significant" 94 and deprived the IEP
team of the general education perspective, and that this error essentially
denied M.L. educational opportunitl 5 ), but he arranged these arguments
under the label of "structural defect," which "precludes" a review of the
substantive effect of this error. 96 This "per se" standard raises the
question of how such a standard might be applied to other types of
procedural errors which are perhaps of lesser substantive significance. 97
In short, Judge Alarcon's unconventional approach left the door open;
the issue of procedural error and its effect on an IEP remains
unpredictable.
V. REALITY CHECK: APPLYING IDEA AND ITS REGULAR EDUCATION
REQUIREMENT
How does M.L. relate to the reality of IEPs as viewed by educators
and education scholars throughout the country? Articles in various
special education journals articulated for their readership the significant
changes in the 1997 amendments of the IDEA-among these changes,
the requirement that a regular education teacher be involved in the IEP
process. This requirement is generally recognized by educators as one
which serves the IDEA's goal of more effectively mainstreaming special
education students. These and other articles emphasize the value of
mainstreaming; in particular, teacher communication and training are
vital components of this mainstreaming process. However, while the
regular education teacher requirement is viewed as a good thing by many
educators, it also has a few practical and real difficulties. As school
districts make the changes necessary to bring IEP procedures into full
compliance with the IDEA 1997 amendments, the question of judicial
involvement also remains uncertain.
A. The Regular Education Teacher Requirement and Mainstreaming, As
Per Educators

Educators view the 1997 IDEA amendments as significantly

94. Id. at 646.
95. Jd.at646,648.
96. Id. at 636; see also id. at 648 ("! conclude that the failure to include at least one regular
education teacher, standing alone, is a structural defect that prejudices the right of a disabled student
to receive a FAPE.").
97. Id. at 655, n. 7 (Gould, C.)., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("Judge
Alarcon's opinion posits no necessary or logical stopping point prohibiting future courts from
applying a structural error approach to virtually any IDEA procedural error.").
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changing IDEA application in schools. 98 In an article which details these
changes for the benefit of teachers and administrators, the authors
recognize that individual changes, such as the regular education teacher
requirement, reflect a major shift toward educating special needs
students in the regular education system where possible. 99 Thus, general
education becomes the basis for all education, and special education
takes on the role of supplementing this general education for students
with special needs. 100
Since generally there is a perceived gap in communication and
understanding between special education and general education
teachers, 101 educators and scholars feel that an increase in collaboration
is vital to the success of mainstreaming efforts. 102 The IDEA '97 mandate
to involve a regular education teacher in IEP development with special
education teachers and others should help to increase communication

98. See e.g. Dixie Snow Huefner, The Risks and Opportunities of the IEP Requirements under
IDEA '97, 33 j. Spec. Educ. 195, 195 (2000) (recognizing that the new requirements of the 1997 IDEA
have "significant implications for both general and special educators").
99. Mitchell L.
Special and General
Exceptional Children
"reflects the emphasis

Yell & james G. Shriner, The IDEA Amendments of 1997: Implications for
Education Teachers, Administrators, and Teacher Trainers, 30 Focus on
1, 4-5 (Sept. 1997) (noting that the general education teacher requirement
on general curricular involvement found throughout the IDEA").

100. Id.; jeannie Kleinhammer-Tramill, An Analysis of Federal Initiatives to Prepare Regular
Educators to Serve Students with Disabilities: Deans' Grants, REG!, and Beyond, 26 Teacher Educ.
and Spec. Educ. 230, 238 (2003) ("For the first time, the legislation attributed primary responsibility
and accountability for all students with disabilities to regular education and clarified special
education's role as providing support to the regular education system."); Lawrence). O'Shea et al.,
IDEA '97 and Educator Standards: Special Educators' Perceptions of Their Skills and Those of General
Educators, 23 Teacher Educ. and Spec. Educ. 125, 125 (2000) ("IDEA '97 signals that general
education curricula must be viewed as the starting place for all students.").
10 I. See e.g. Roy Brookshire & jack Klotz, Selected Teachers' Perceptions of Special Education
Laws 4, http:/ /www.eric.ed.gov/ERI CDocs/ data/ ericdocs2/ content_storage_O 1/OOOOOOOb/80/28/
18/a9.pdf (Nov. 2002) (suggesting that the lack of emphasis on special education in the university
curriculum for regular education teachers "tends to build a gap between regular education teachers
and special education teachers"); Thomas C. Lovitt & Suzanne Cushing, Parents of Youth with
Disabilities: Their Perceptions of School Programs, 20 Remedial and Spec. Educ. 134, 136 (1999)
(stating that parents are often surprised and dismayed to realize that their child's regular education
teacher is unaware of the child's special needs); O'Shea, supra n. 100, at 135 (suggesting that special
educators' responses to a survey on general and special education curricula "may reflect a pervasive
school culture characterized by a lack of interactions and support between general and special
educators") (citation omitted).
102. Various articles by educators and scholars emphasize the need to increase collaboration
and offer practical suggestions on doing so. See e.g. Sally Vargo, Consulting: Teacher-to-Teacher,
Teaching Exceptional Children 54, 54 (Jan.-Feb. 1998) (citation omitted) (recommending a basic
model for special education and regular education teacher collaboration); see also Yell & Shriner,
supra n. 99, at 18 ("A more collaborative relationship between general educators and special
educators is likely to be needed. Planning, implementing, and evaluating instructional programs will
necessitate more frequent communication across disciplines than is sometimes found in today's
schools.").
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and thereby lessen that gap. 103 Educators recognize benefits of complying
with the requirement, such as increased opportunity for general
education teachers to obtain needed support and to provide insight into
educational possibility, 104 as well as acquire greater understanding of
special education options. 105
B. Problems and Unanswered Questions in Instituting the Regular
Education Teacher Requirement

While educators recognize the regular education teacher requirement
and its purpose, they also face practical concerns and questions in its
application. One education article deals with the underlying problems of
regular education teacher involvement in an IEP, stating that while the
value of this involvement is clear, "we [educators] know the reality of
what happens in actual practice." 106 The article lists five basic reasons
that regular education teachers are not present at IEP meetings: team
connection (i.e. lack of a sense that the regular teacher is valued and
understood), lack of time, lack of effective preparation, lack of training,
and lack of apparent relevance of the IEP to the regular education
teacher's interactions with the student. 107
These problems create questions which have not yet been answered.
For example, if IEP meetings are scheduled during a teacher's contract
day, should funds be allocated to hiring a substitute teacher during these
meetings? Could one general education teacher be designated to attend
all IEP meetings, or could the assignment to attend IEP meetings rotate
through a group of teachers? Could the requirement be filled by a
guidance counselor in lieu of actual classroom teachers? 108 In essence,
despite statutory limitations on the regular education teacher's
involvement, teachers are feeling the strain of additional responsibilities.
103. See e.g. Susan G. Clark, The IEP Process as a Tool for Collaboration, Teaching Exceptional
Children 56, 58, 60-61 (Nov.-Dec. 2000) (recognizing value in the perspective of a general educator
in identifying needed supplementary aids or program modification as well as in creating and
implementing behavioral goals); Margaret ]. McLaughlin et al., Integrating Standards: Including All
Students, Teaching Exceptional Children 66, 66 (Jan.-Feb. 1999) (noting that the IDEA's regular
education teacher requirement "reinforces the importance of collaboration" (emphasis added)).
104. Huefner, supra n. 98, at 203.
105. O'Shea, supra n. 100, at 135.
106. Ronda R. Menlove et a!., A Field of IEP Dreams: Increasing General Education Teacher
Participation in the IEP Development Process, Teaching Exceptional Children 28, 29 (May-june
1998).
107. Id. at 28-32.
108. Each of these possibilities is mentioned in a report consisting of research on the question
of the regular education teacher requirement. Nat!. Assn. of St. Dirs. of Spec. Educ., Involvement of
General Education Teachers in the IEP Process 4-6, http:/ /www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/
ericdocs2/content_storage_Ol!OOOOOOOb/80/11!43/Sb.pdf (Dec. 1998).
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As a result, schools may look for creative responses, which may or may
not fulfill the legislative requirement. 109
C. The Issue of the Judicial Role

Through the IDEA, collaboration between regular and special
education teachers, a generally-recognized ideal, becomes a legal
requirement and has real legal implications. Some education authors
create checklists intended to help school districts comply with the
extensive procedural provisions of the IDEA, reminding educators that if
these "most critical procedural requirements of IDEA" are not followed,
the school district risks legal repercussions. 110 One author recognizes that
the specific failure to include a regular education teacher may raise a
concern of predetermination; that is, school districts risk liability with
this particular error because it may imply an inappropriate pre-IEP
decision that a student would not qualify for any portion of regular
education.lll Indeed, M.L.'s story raises this precise concern: does the
FWSD's failure to include a regular education teacher on the IEP team
suggest the School District had already determined that regular
education was not an option?
While education journal articles warn educators of potential liability
for failure to comply with the IDEA, the courts' role in enforcing this
compliance is still somewhat nebulous. One educator laments the
potential for "more intrusiveness by the legal system" 112 as a result of
IDEA changes which "will surely generate a new wave of court cases
testing their limits." 113 She questions what courts will do with the IDEA's
increased emphasis on measurable results or how, if at all, courts will
address IEP substance and concludes that "the judicial response to the
new IEP requirements bears watching." 114 The Ninth Circuit's decision
in M.L. is a piece of this anticipated judicial response. The adoption of a
per se standard avoids excessive intrusion, in that any finding of a
procedural violation bars substantive review of IEP appropriateness.
Thus, the question of substantive compliance remains in the hands of

!09. Some sources impliedly refute these creative possibilities. For example, one IEP checklist
of "the most critical procedural requirements of IDEA" states that "[t]he general education teacher
participating in the meeting should be the teacher who is, or may be, responsible for implementing
the IEP." Erik Drasgow et al., Developing Legally Correct and Educationally Appropriate IEPs, 22
Remedial and Spec. Educ. 359, 362 tbl. 1 (2001).
!10. Jd. at 369-70 fig. 2.
111. Clark, supra n. I 03, at 58.
112. Huefner, supra n. 98, at 196.
113. Jd. at 195.
114. Id. at 202.
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administrators and ALJs. The plurality opinion in M.L., however, shows
that this resolution is far from final and definitive. Indeed, educators and
courts alike are still left wondering: what role should federal courts play
in the enforcement of the IDEA's procedural and substantive provisions?
VI. CONCLUSION

The IDEA's regular education teacher requirement adds important
elements to IEP meetings for special education students. Through this
requirement, the special education student receives the benefits of the
regular education teacher's perspective and an added focus on
mainstreaming opportunities. These benefits can increase educational
opportunity for the student. As mainstreaming becomes an increasingly
important goal in special education, educators recognize, from the
theoretical perspective, the value of collaboration between regular and
special education teachers. However, these educators also face various
practical difficulties, in fulfilling the requirement, such as limitations on
time and resources.
The Ninth Circuit's holding in M.L. v. Federal Way School District
leaves questions regarding the IDEA regular education teacher
requirement essentially unanswered. While the legislature, the courts,
and educators all agree that the requirement is a significant and valuable
aspect of the IDEA's important goal of including special education
students in regular education classrooms, the enforcement of this
provision remains unclear. The various opinions arising out of the Ninth
Circuit's plurality holding demonstrate the lack of a general consensus
with regard to this particular procedural error. While it seems fairly clear
that M.L. should have had the right to a regular education teacher's
perspective in the formulation of his educational plan, educators and
administrators generally remain in the dark as to the details of this
procedural requirement. Will this type of procedural defect always result
in a decision for the student, or is there room for a showing of no
substantive harm? How do the judicial tests apply to other procedural
errors, and which test will be applied? Indeed, the adoption of a per se
standard by Judge Alarcon contradicts the procedural error analysis
applied by other circuits, which generally consider whether the error
actually resulted in the loss of educational opportunity.
In summary, and perhaps of greatest importance to educators, the
plurality opinion in M.L. still did not refine for educators how to actually
apply the regular education teacher requirement. How far will courts go
in analyzing regular teacher participation in IEP development meetings?
With the court's lack of consensus, educators cannot discern with any
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reasonable certainty if courts will invalidate every procedural error or if
courts will be willing to consider whether or not the error actually
harmed the student. Although the IDEA expressly limits regular
education teacher involvement in order to avoid overburdening teachers,
the judicial adoption of a per se standard would infringe on educators'
discretion in determining the appropriate level of involvement of the
regular education teacher. Educators' concerns about application of the
requirement therefore remain unresolved. In short, the issue of a regular
education teacher's involvement in IEP development reveals unclear gaps
in the law, and the Ninth Circuit in M.L. does little to clarify them.
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